

the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but of apprehension. A further basis for a motion to reconsider would be a controlling or significant change in the law or acts since the submission of the issue to the Court. Such problems rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare.


Id. Indeed, because of the interest in finality, courts should grant motions for reconsideration sparingly. Univ. of Va. Patent Found. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 755 F. Supp. 2d 738, 743–44 (W.D. Va. 2011) (quoting Dayoub v. Penn–Del Directory Co., 90 F. Supp. 2d 636, 637 (E.D. Pa 2000)); see Downie v. Revco Discount Drug Ctrs., No. 3:05cv00021, 2006 WL 1171960, at *1 (W.D. Va. May 1, 2006). A motion to reconsider should not be used to reiterate arguments previously made or “to ask the Court to rethink what the Court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Above the Belt, Inc., 99 F.R.D. at 100.

Because Turner filed his motion for reconsideration within 28 days of the court’s dismissal order, the court will construe it as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). See Dove v. CODESCO, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978) (“[I]f a post judgment motion is filed within ten days of the entry of judgment and calls into question the correctness of that judgment it should be treated as a motion under Rule 59(e), however it may be formally styled.”); see also MLC Auto., LLC v. Town of S. Pines, 532 F.3d 269, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting CODESCO continues to apply notwithstanding the amendment of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4). Although Rule 59(e) does not set forth the standard under which a district court may amend an earlier judgment, the Fourth Circuit has outlined three reasons for doing so: “(1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear

error of law or prevent manifest injustice.” Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076, 1081 (4th Cir. 1993). None of these circumstances is present in the instant case. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The court’s exclusive jurisdiction to review final decisions of the Commissioner of Social Security is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 405 and is limited to *final* decisions by the Commissioner. As there appears to be no such final decision rendered in this case, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Turner’s claim. Turner’s motion for reconsideration therefore will be **DENIED**.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Entered: 06/18/2017

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. Urbanski', with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Michael F. Urbanski
United States District Judge